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Evidence of cultural influences on cognition is accumulating, but untangling these
cultural influences from one another or from non-cultural influences has remained a
challenging task. As between-group differences are neither a sufficient nor a necessary
indicator of cultural impact, cross-cultural comparisons in isolation are unable to furnish
any cogent conclusions. This shortfall can be compensated by taking a diachronic
perspective that focuses on the role of culture for the emergence and evolution
of our cognitive abilities. Three strategies for reconstructing early human cognition
are presented: the chaîne opératoire approach and its extension to brain-imaging
studies, large-scale extrapolations, and phylogenetic comparative methods. While these
strategies are reliant on our understanding of present-day cognition, they conversely
also have the potential to advance this understanding in fundamental ways.
Keywords: cognition, culture, evolution, early humans, chaîne opératoire, cross-cultural comparisons,
phylogenetic comparative methods
INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF CULTURE FOR COGNITION
Human cognition is profoundly shaped by culture. This is perhaps more evident for some domains
than for others, but striking examples abound: orientation in and referencing to space and time
(Levinson, 2003; Haun et al., 2011; Bender and Beller, 2014b), reasoning about the biological
world (Medin and Atran, 2004; Bang et al., 2007; Ojalehto et al., 2017a,b), accounting for cause–
effect relations (Choi et al., 1999; Bender and Beller, 2019), or representations of numbers (Beller
and Bender, 2008; Bender and Beller, 2012, 2014a; Núñez, 2017), not to mention the way in
which we conceptualize social relationships (Fiske, 1992; Lillard, 1998) and ourselves within them
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991). As much as they are rendered possible by endowed capacities, all of
these cognitive abilities, activities, and achievements are also predicated on culture, be it by way
of culturally accumulated and transmitted knowledge, culture-specific concepts and framework
theories, cultural tools, conventions, and practices, or simply by the fact that we are a cultural
species (Tomasello et al., 2005; Henrich, 2016; Heyes, 2018; Bender, 2019).
Limitations of Cross-Cultural Studies
Despite increasing evidence for the existence of cultural influences on cognition, untangling them
from one another or from non-cultural influences has remained a challenging task. One obvious,
and increasingly popular, strategy is cross-cultural comparison. Such studies do help us to detect
diversity in cognitive phenomena, but they do not reveal the extent to which this diversity is brought
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about by culture. For instance, ethnolinguistic groups differ
regarding which frame of reference they habitually adopt
for representing spatial relations. Whether, however, these
differences are due to linguistic availabilities, to cultural
preferences, or to environmental affordances and constraints
is subject to ongoing debate (overviews in Majid et al., 2004;
Bohnemeyer et al., 2014).
While such differences are interesting in any case, in that they
attest to cognitive diversity, for us to be willing to accept them as
cultural differences, we would want them to involve at least two
types of social processes: one for generating the pattern (such as
transmission) and one for stabilizing it (such as mutual coercion).
After all, the hallmarks of culture are learning, sharing, and
some extent of normativity (Brumann, 1999; Gatewood, 2012; de
Munck and Bennardo, 2019). As a minimum standard, therefore,
cross-cultural studies would have to be complemented and
bolstered by in-depth ethnographic investigations of where these
group-specific patterns originate, how they spread, and how they
are maintained (for a rare example of this combination, see Dasen
and Mishra, 2010). Another strategy for teasing apart influences
of culture from other factors is triangulation: comparing one
group with two others that differ from the former on distinct
dimensions, one regarding culture, the other regarding, say,
environmental experience (Medin and Atran, 2004).
In addition to not being sufficient as indicators of cultural
influences, between-group differences are not necessary either.
Theory of mind, for instance, is the ability for mental reasoning,
which humans typically acquire long before adulthood. It may
thus seem to be a textbook example of an ability with which
humans are endowed. Still, its development benefits from, if
not relies on, social interaction and cultural practices, including
a focus on mental states and the use of mentalistic language
(Ruffman et al., 2002; Pyers and Senghas, 2009; overview in
Träuble et al., 2013; Slaughter and Perez-Zapata, 2014). As a
consequence of culture’s pivotal role in the development of this
ability, all human populations – unlike any other species –
become so attuned to reasoning about others’ minds that they
cannot help but also ascribe some form of mental reasoning
to species that, for all we know, most likely lack this ability
(Povinelli and Vonk, 2003). That is, culture impacts on cognition
not only as a means of diversification, but also, and profoundly
so, as a driving force in cognitive evolution and development.
Yet, if asserting whether between-group differences in cognitive
behavior are caused by culture is already challenging, then
asserting an influence of culture in those instances in which
it does not even produce any differences poses seemingly
insurmountable obstacles.
In short, cross-cultural comparisons are a valuable scientific
tool for the investigation of cognitive diversification, but in
isolation they fall short of furnishing any cogent conclusions:
While they allow us to detect differences, they do not allow
us to infer an impact of culture from the presence of such
differences, or indeed to infer a lack of impact from their absence.
Crucially, cross-cultural comparisons remain largely silent on the
scaffolding role of culture – a shortfall that can be compensated
by adopting an evolutionary perspective on how aspects of
specifically human cognition emerged.
The Potential of an Evolutionary
Perspective
Assessing the role of culture for early human cognition is
important both on ontological and epistemic grounds: It
is a subject worthy of investigation in its own right, but
it is also an essential qualification in all attempts to reconstruct
past cognition.
Several hundred thousand years ago, early Homo sapiens
learned to control fire, invented complex tools such as bow-
and-arrow sets, and began to use abstract symbols and language
(Henshilwood et al., 2002, 2018; Wadley, 2013; Backwell et al.,
2018). Even in hindsight, these achievements strike us as truly
impressive, yet what made them possible has remained one
of the most tantalizing questions of human evolution. Among
paleoscientists, there is increasing consensus that most, if not
all, important innovations made by Homo sapiens were brought
about by evolutionary mechanisms in which culture was the
major driving force (for more details and examples, see Colagè
and d’Errico, 2018; Bender, 2019; Sterelny, 2019). One such
mechanism is the cultural transmission and accumulation of
knowledge, ideas, and inventions, which generates the “ratchet
effect” so characteristic of human culture (Tennie et al., 2009;
Henrich, 2016). It is attested to, for instance, in numerical
cognition, in which a concept, once understood, paves the way for
further elaboration (Miller and Paredes, 1996). Existing cultural
achievements may also be co-opted for new cognitive purposes,
a mechanism that is called cultural exaptation and has been
detailed for number notations (d’Errico et al., 2017; d’Errico and
Colagè, 2018). Even brain anatomy and gene pool are impacted
by culture, through mechanisms such as cultural neural reuse
and gene-culture coevolution: the former by recycling cortical
maps, as in the case of literacy (Dehaene and Cohen, 2007;
d’Errico and Colagè, 2018), the latter by exerting pressure on gene
selection (Boyd and Richerson, 1988; Laland et al., 2010). Our
language abilities, for instance, are linked to genetic mutations
that are present in the human line, but not in other primates.
While, according to a standard scenario of pure natural selection,
language use would have been “switched on” in individuals
possessing the mutation, gene-culture co-evolution opens up
a more convincing, alternative scenario: that some form of
language use was already part of the cultural environment, in
which the mutation could then confer a selective advantage
(Fisher and Marcus, 2006; Fisher and Ridley, 2013).
In short, culture helped us to develop cognitive capacities
(such as language), cognitive tools (such as writing), and
cognitive skills (such as calculation). Investigating the
mechanisms that sparked off and shaped these capacities,
tools, and skills is therefore essential, as it will enable us to
illuminate the instrumental role of culture.
RECONSTRUCTING EARLY HUMAN
COGNITION
When trying to delineate the impact of culture on the emergence,
evolution, and molding of what makes human cognition unique,
we face a major challenge. Other than the material remains of
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humans and the material output of their activities, the cognitive
skill set and knowledge available to our ancestors have left no
direct traces in the archeological record and therefore have to be
inferred. Three such approaches from a wide range of disciplines
are detailed below: reconstructing the cognitive underpinnings of
past activities, large-scale extrapolation of cognitive abilities, and
retracing the cultural evolution of cognitive systems.
Reconstructing Cognition Involved in
“Past Activities”
The approach generally adopted in cognitive archeology is a
kind of reverse engineering. Taking the material remains of an
artifact as a starting point, the implicated chaîne opératoire is
then deployed to reconstruct the steps required for its production,
ranging from acquisition of the raw material to manufacturing
and subsequent use. It then goes from the behavioral components
involved in these processing steps back further to infer the
cognitive and social endowment indispensable for production,
such as working memory capacity or focus of attention (Sellet,
1993; Haidle, 2010, 2014).
Lombard and Haidle (2012) elaborated this type of analysis
for the production of bow-and-arrow sets, which date back to at
least the Middle Stone Age in Sub-Saharan Africa (Backwell et al.,
2018). This complementary tool set, in which the extraordinary
efficiency of the components only unfolds when they are used
jointly, was a major technological advancement, linked to an
increase in cognitive and behavioral flexibility. Its invention
required the craftsperson to conceive of a novel idea, for which
several unrelated elements needed to be detached from their
distinct context and combined to form something entirely new.
This ability to assemble objects and actions in a modular manner
is considered as a major breakthrough in problem-solving and
creativity (Lombard and Haidle, 2012).
Such reconstructions of the cognitive, behavioral, and social
components necessary for the production of prehistoric tools are
increasingly complemented by neuroscientific methods (Stout
and Chaminade, 2007). To identify the neural substrates involved
in past activities such as flint-knapping, the brain activation
of present-day participants is measured while they engage in
mental imagery of these activities. This helped researchers to
ascertain, for instance, that more advanced tool-making requires
more efficient visuomotor coordination and hierarchical action
organization, and points to a shared basis of tool-making and
language (Stout et al., 2008). More recently, Mellet et al. (2019)
adopted a similar strategy to investigate symbol processing. They
found that prehistoric engravings are perceived by present-day
participants as organized and meaningful representations, which
suggests a symbolic function also for those who created them.
These reconstructive approaches all share the assumption that
our human ancestors possessed an almost identical genome,
similar brain structures, and hence basically the same cognitive
capacities as do contemporary humans. While this assumption
is plausible, the inference that early sapiens cognition can
therefore be simply extrapolated from today’s cognition is more
contestable. This inference is valid only to the extent that it takes
into account the changes brought about by cultural evolution and
ensuing cognitive diversification.
Reconstructing “Past Cognition” by
Extrapolation
When attempting to extrapolate from present-day cognition to
past cognition, two major challenges need to be tackled: One is
to delineate basic aspects from all of those that are generated by
mechanisms of cultural evolution, and the other is to delineate
universal aspects from all of those that are shaped by culture.
These two tasks require different approaches.
The delineation of basic aspects of cognition is aided by
insights from a wide range of disciplines including evolutionary
anthropology and paleoanthropology, archeology, comparative
psychology, and language evolution. This research helps to
identify the set of social and cognitive skills that is uniquely
human (Haun et al., 2010; Tomasello and Herrmann, 2010), the
evolutionary mechanisms that enabled them, such as cumulative
culture and cultural exaptation (Tennie et al., 2009; Colagè
and d’Errico, 2018; Heyes, 2018), and characteristics of those
processes and constraints that continue to shape cognitive tools
and skills (Christiansen and Chater, 2008; Lupyan and Dale,
2016). The classic example of a cultural innovation with a
profound impact on cognition is literacy. Learning to read and
write not only facilitates the accumulation and transmission of
knowledge on a grand new scale (Huettig and Mishra, 2014;
Morin et al., 2018), but also rewires the individual brain (Dehaene
and Cohen, 2007). When extrapolating to past cognition, we
therefore need to discount the neural and cognitive changes
brought about by cultural innovations such as literacy and, more
generally, we need a more exhaustive overview of the range of
changes to be taken into account.
For delineating universal aspects of cognition, large-scale
cross-cultural studies are an important step (e.g., Majid et al.,
2004, 2015; Henrich et al., 2005, 2010a; Bohnemeyer et al., 2014).
For the case of language, such studies have found substantial
diversity on almost every level of linguistic organization (Evans
and Levinson, 2009; Dunn et al., 2011). The universals that
could be established so far seem to be confined to aspects
of usage such as turn-taking and repair (Dingemanse et al.,
2015; Levinson, 2016). A better understanding of what is really
shared by present-day humans, however, is a prerequisite for
any attempt to extrapolate our models and assumptions to early
sapiens cognition.
Yet, as noted before, the identification of diversity can only
be the first in a series of steps, and needs to be enriched
by deep ethnographic understanding. When combining cross-
cultural studies with investigations into cognitive development
and across species (Liebal and Haun, 2018), we are able to
more accurately assess the proportions of cultural diversity
and convergence that are due to hereditary predispositions
compared to those transformed by cultural influences (Haun
et al., 2006). An even more comprehensive combination of
approaches was tested recently for causal cognition (Bender
and Beller, 2019): Research across species, back into prehistory,
and on cognitive development was surveyed to identify those
aspects of causal cognition that are specific to humans rather
than shared by other primates, and research across cultures
and languages was surveyed to identify both commonalities
and differences. One specifically human feature is the pivotal
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role of causally relevant knowledge, most of which is culturally
accumulated and transmitted. As a consequence, causal cognition
in humans is shaped by culture in two ways: It is diverse
across cultural traditions, and it is molded more generally
by the distinct characteristics of human sociality, modes of
teaching, and language.
Reconstructing “Past Cognition” From
Present Diversity
While the previously mentioned strategies try to take cultural
evolution and diversity into account on inferential grounds,
the third approach, originating from evolutionary biology and
anthropology, capitalizes precisely on present-day diversity, as
reflected, for instance, in conceptual systems. In principle,
diversity in such systems is understood to be an outcome
of evolutionary processes, either due to random changes or
to systematic transformations. With the help of phylogenetic
comparative methods, evolution can therefore be “re-run” in
order to gauge the relative proportions of these sources. The same
approach also allows one to infer past states of such systems, to
assess their transformations, and to retrace co-evolution between
system properties and other factors (Mace and Holden, 2005;
Levinson and Gray, 2012).
Let us illustrate its explanatory power for systems of kinship
terminology (Jordan, 2013). Given the clear and strong biological
underpinnings of kin relations, the degree of diversity exhibited
by kinship systems is astonishing – and still by no means
unlimited (Levinson, 2012). Differences occur particularly in the
extent to which features such as generation, gender, relative
age, or connecting relatives are relevant for classification. Some
systems, for instance, collate cousins with brothers and sisters,
while others distinguish between same- and opposite-sex cousins
of same- or opposite -sex parents (rendering some of them
prohibited and some desired marriage partners). Harnessing
phylogenetic comparative methods has helped to identify the
semantic distinctions made in a kinship system, or the settlement
patterns based thereupon, in ancestral populations and to assess
how these have changed over time (Jordan et al., 2009; Jordan,
2011). The same methods can also be deployed to test hypotheses
regarding cognitive constraints on a system’s complexity. For
the case of kinship systems, several constraining factors have
been identified, among them general communicative principles
that balance informativeness and simplicity, language-specifics
such as descent from a joint ancestor language, and the social
practices linked to the kinship systems (Kemp and Regier, 2012;
Rácz et al., 2019).
In a nutshell, the modeling of evolutionary trajectories enables
us to ascertain the primal states of cognitive systems and to
reconstruct the conditions under which such states are likely
to change. This renders it a powerful tool for reconstructing
past cognition from present-day diversity, specifically in those
domains for which rich phylogenetic language trees are available.
CONCLUSION
The strategies presented here are an important step toward
the reconstruction of early sapiens cognition, but their true
potential is greater. While each of these strategies is reliant on our
understanding of present-day cognition, they also substantially
advance this understanding, including an appreciation of
how cognition is influenced by culture. More concretely,
they help to delineate those aspects of cognition that are
widely shared and universal, and allow us to assess more
general constraints on diversity. They help to illuminate
the conditions under which aspects of cognition emerged,
evolved, and changed, as well as the time scales in which
this happened. By retracing evolutionary trajectories, they
help to identify components with which a cognitive skill or
tool may have co-evolved. And by identifying these driving
forces in cognitive evolution, finally, they also raise our
awareness of the extent to which these factors continue to
impact on cognition.
Since its emergence, cognitive science has been strongly
committed to the assumption that cognition basically works in
the same way across all human populations (Flanagan, 1991) –
a view still popular in wide parts of cognitive psychology.
The insight that variability in cognition may indeed be greater
than long assumed is slowly gaining ground (Bender et al.,
2015; Bender, 2019). An accumulation of empirical findings
(e.g., Levinson, 2003; Medin and Atran, 2004; Bender and
Beller, 2016) and methodological criticism from within the
cognitive sciences (Arnett, 2008; Henrich et al., 2010b) has
helped to promote an attitude change. But the research field
still has a long way to go from acknowledging the existence
of cognitive diversity to accepting the profound impacts of
culture, or to be able to untangle the processes involved.
The position championed here is that real progress in this
regard will depend on combining different perspectives in
an interdisciplinary effort to investigate cognition across both
cultures and time. We have a lot to learn from today’s
cognitive diversity for the evolution of human cognition,
but we have equally much to learn from our ancestors for
today’s cognition.
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